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Abstract
Recent studies of physician pricing have pointed to the difficulty of developing a satisfactory theory of
physician price determination. Wliile much thought has been given to the various special characteristics of the
market for medical services (for example, see references 2, 5, 8, 9, 11, and 12), no single theory incorporates
all the implications of such char acteristics. In addition, much of the limited empirical work on physician
pricing fails to either support or reject proposed models having a priori appeal. For example, Newhouse
constructed monopolistic and competitive models of physician pricing and attempted to demonstrate that his
empirical results support the hypothesis that the market for physicians' services is monopolistic [13].
However, in a comment on the Newhouse study, Freeh and Ginsberg demonstrated that Newhouse's
empirical findings could not distinguish between monopolistic and competitive pricing under standard profit
maximization assumptions [6].
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I INTRODUCTION
Recent studies of physician pricing have pointed to the difficulty of
developing a satisfactory theory of physician price determination. Wliile
much thought has been given to the various special characteristics of the
market for medical services (for example, see references 2, 5, 8, 9, 11,
and 12), no single theory incorporates all the implications of such char
acteristics. In addition, much of the limited empirical work on physician
pricing fails to either support or reject proposed nradels having a priori
appeal. For example, Newhouse constructed monopolistic and competitive
models of physician pricing and attempted to demonstrate that his empirical
results support the hypothesis that the market for physicians' services is
monopolistic [13]. However, in a comment on the Newhouse study, Freeh and
Ginsberg demonstrated that Newhouse's empirical findings could not distin
guish between monopolistic and con^etitive pricing under standard profit-
maximization assumptions [6].
In a 197A article, Steinwald and Sloan attempted to use the empirical
results of a study of the determinants of physician fees to provide some
insight into the appropriateness of various theories of physician pricing [14].
Included among the theories considered were: competitive and monopoly profit
maximization; utility maximization; pricing to achieve a target income;
non-price rationing (i.e., pricing to maintain permanent excess demand in
order to allow physicians some discretion to select the most medically
Interesting cases); and markup pricing. The empirical results lead to ten
tative rejection of the models of markup pricing and non-price rationing
and indicate that the target-income model may also be less appropriate than
some previous studies suggested. The authors conclude by supporting con
tinued usage of "standard" profit-maximization models [14, 510-511],
This paper seeks to provide additional understanding of the nature of
physician pricing through statistical analysis of the determinants of cross-
sectional variation in the pricing of physicians' services. The data
employed was obtained from the Center for Health Services Research and
Development of the American Medical Association. The 1969 5th Periodic
Survey of Physicians is a cross-sectional survey of individual physicians
for 1968-1969. Using a set of computer-generated random numbers, 7563
physicians were randomly selected for the 5th Periodic Survey from the AMA's
Masterfile of Physicians, which contains information on all physicians
practicing or residing in the United States. The usable number of responses
was 4689 physicians (or 62% of the original sample).^ The data set included
individual physician pricing data on fourteen different procedures, all of
which are relatively standard medical procedures that can be performed by
any licensed physician. Two of these were selected, namely, the obstetrical
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care and the appendectomy procedures. From the 4689 physicians included
in the data set, those physicians who performed either or both of the two
procedures were selected. The resulting sample size was 713 physicians for
the obstetrical care procedure and 726 physicians for the appendectomy
procedure. Data on two additional variables was added to the AMA data set;
population per physician by county size was obtained from Reference Data on
the Profile of Medical Practice [3, 90] and state per capita income was
obtained from the "1969 Survey of Buying Power" [15, c-12-c-122].
The following section discusses the nature of the model used, specific
hypotheses concerning the determinants of physician pricing, and descriptions
of the variables employed. Section III presents and discusses the empirical
results, and the final section summarizes the insights gained by the statis
tical analysis.
II MODEL, HYPOTHESES'AND VARIABLE MEASUREMENT
The characteristics of the market for physicians' services preclude
application of both the model of perfect competition and that of pure
monopoly; instead, a model of imperfect competition is appropriate. As
Fuchs and Kramer point out,
"With respect to physicians' services, the imperfections
of competition are numerous and powerful. On the supply
side, these include the restrictions on entry created by
licensure and professional control of medical education,
the limitations on practice implicit in the hospital
appointment system, and the absence of price cutting,
advertising, and other forms of rivalry. As for demand,
the difficulty consumers experience in judging the qual
ity of physicians' services is well knowri, and it is
thought by some that the physician plays a major role in
determining the quantity of services to be provided" [7, 1].
The model of physician pricing used in this study assumes that each
physician faces a downward sloping demand curve for his services, thereby
providing the physician some monopolistic ability to set price and quantity.
Multiple linear regression analysis is used to establish the significance of
a wide range of variables hypothesized to influence the price a physician
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charges for his services. The independent variables are grouped into four
categories: physician characteristics, demographic characteristics,
structural characteristics, and costs of producing medical care. The depen
dent variable used for each medical procedure is the average price a
physician charges a patient of middle income in the absence of complications.^
A. Physician Characteristics
1. Degree of specialization
The degree of specialization of the physician is hypothesized to
have a positive effect on price, since the more specialized a physician
is, the higher the quality of service he should be capable of rendering
to his patients, especially in the provision of those procedures that
are included in his specialty.
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The 5th Periodic Survey of Physicians requested that each physician
indicate the specialty area of medicine from which he derives 50% or
more of his medical income. With the use of dummy variables each
physician in the samples was classified according to whether he is a
general practitioner, a specialist in the specialty field of medicine
that is most closely identified with the procedure in question, or a
specialist in another specialty. For both procedures studied, the base
for the dummy variables measuring specialization is general practice.
The coefficient for "primary specialty" (PSP) indicates the fee differ
ence between general practitioners and those physicians who received
50% or more of their medical income from the specialty that typically
performs the procedure in question. For the obstetrical care procedure,
the relevant primary specialty is Obstetrics and Gynecology; for the
appendectomy procedure, Surgery was selected as the relevant primary
specialty. The coefficient of the second specialty dummy variable,
"other specialty" (OSP) indicates the price difference between general
practitioners and physicians who are specialists in a specialty other
than that chosen as the relevant primary specialty.
Thus, a positive relationship is expected between primary spe
cialty (PSP) and price and between other specialty (OSP) and price.
In addition, it is hypothesized that the size of the coefficient of
PSP will be larger than that of OSP; this follows from the assumption
that a specialist performing a procedure that is not included in his
specialty will produce (or at least will be perceived by patients as
producing) a service of lower quality than the relevant specialist who
is better trained to perform the procedure in question,^
2. Years of experience
A priori it is impossible to predict the direction of the net effect
of years of experience on the quality of services provided and thus on
price. On the one hand, years of experience should have a positive effect
on price in that the quality of a good or service is assumed to increase
as the producer becomes more experienced, Steinwald and Sloan have also
suggested that older physicians may have increased preferences for
leisure; consequently, they may charge higher prices to encourage a •
reduction in'their numbers of patients [14, 501]. Another potential
cause of a positive relationship between years of experience and price is
the possibility -that newly licensed physicians will charge relatively
low fees in order to attract patients [14, 500]. On the other hand, it
may be that rapid advancements in medical technology and procedures result
in a relatively inexperienced physician producing a higher quality of
medical care.because he has acquired new medical knowledge that the more
experienced physician is unaware of.^
The following three alternative measures of years of experience
were tested for statistical significance:
YRS^--years since graduation (from medical school)
YRS^—years in specialty
YRS^—years in specialty, excluding residency
3. Physician sex
It is hypothesized that women physicians may be discriminated against
by patients seeking medical care. If, ceteris paribus^ patients prefer
male to female physicians,^ this will be revealed in the model by the
existence of different demand curves for male and female physicians, with
the patient demand curves for the services of female physicians being
positioned to the left of the demand curves for male physicians. In such
a situation, the influence of physician sex on price depends on the rela
tive elasticities of demand and marginal costs for male and female physi-
- cians. Since no theoretical reason nor empirically-based information
exists to hypothesize otherwise, it is assumed- that (1) the marginal cost
of providing medical care is constant and equal for male and female physi
cians, and (2) the elasticity of demand is the same for male and female
physicians. Using these assumptions, the model implies that patient
preferences for male physicians will be reflected by female physicians
receiving lower prices than do male physicians.
A dummy variable (SX) having a value of 1 for female physicians and
0 for male physicians is utilized to test the effect on price of the sex
of the physician. Thus, 'the hypothesis is that the coefficient of SX
will be negative, indicating that, ceteris paribus, women receive lower
fees than do male physicians. In addition, the size of the fee differ
ential can be used as an indication of the extent of discrimination
against women physicians.
B. Demographic Characteristics
The demographic factors included in the empirical investigation are per
capita income, population per physician and the degree of urbanization; all
three are with respect to the geographic area in- which the physician practices
medicine. These demographic factors' primarily reflect the demand side of the
market for the services of physicians and can be interpreted as causing shifts
in the demand curves facing the individual physicians. However, they may be
considered to be supply determinants as well, in that physicians may choose
the geographic locations of their practices in response to such demographic
factors.
1. Per capita income
The per capita income of the area in which a physician practices
is hypothesized to have a positive effect on the price of the physi
cian's services for two reasons. The first reason follows from the
inclusion of income as one of the determinants of an individual's demand
curve for the services of a physicianj a higher level of income, ceteris
paribus^ is hypothesized to cause an outward shift in the individual's
demand curve. When aggregating such demand curves over individuals, a
higher level of per capita income of the geographic area is expected to
likewise shift outward the demand curve for the services-, of each indi
vidual physician, thus resulting in higher prices being charged in that
geographic area as compared to regions with lower per capita incomes.
A second related cause for the hypothesized positive relationship
between per capita income and price is the deliberate use of price
discrimination, in the sense that physicians may determine the price
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to charge patients by the criterion of ability-to-pay. Thus, higher
prices are expected in those areas that have higher per capita incomes
than in geographic areas with lower per capita incomes.
State per capita income (INC) is employed as a measure of per
capita income of the geographic area in which the physician practices.
A smaller geographic area than states was preferrable; in particular,
the county or city in which the physician practices were preferred
geographic divisions. However, the AMA data set identified physicians
only by state, thereby necessitating the use of the imperfect state
per capita income measure.
82i Population per physician
In the absence of excess demand, population per physician is also
hypothesized to have a positive effect on physicians' prices since an
increase in population per physician is predicted to shift outward the
demand curve facing a physician. With a larger population per physi
cian, one is aggregating over a larger number of potential patients
to determine the demand curve for the physician under consideration.
However, if excess demand for the services of physicians prevails in
all the geographic areas under consideration, the areas associated
with higher population per physician ratios may not be characterized
by higher physician prices. Therefore, if such excess demand is
typical, one does not expect population per physician to have a
significant effect on prices charged.
As mentioned above,.the AMA data set does not identify physicians
by specific county or city of practice; rather, physicians are classi-
9fied into nine categories according to county population. Also not
included in the AMA data set is population per physician. However, a
rough measure of population per physician was obtained by combining the
county size group codes with information from another AMA source that
presented population per physician by the same nine categories of county
size group codes [3>90]. Thus, the variable used, p/p,,is the average
population per physician of all counties having the same county size group
code classification as that county in which the physician practices.
3. Degree of urbanization
The degree of urbanization of the area in which a physician prac
tices is hypothesized to have a positive effect on price. This explana
tory variable is a proxy measure for those factors that differ depending
on where a physician is located along the continuum ranging from rural
to urban. For example, the degree of urbanization may be an appropriate
proxy measurement of the cost of living in the area in which a physician
practices. But this variable may also reflect the combined effects of
other factors that may consistently differ according to the degree of
urbanization, such as population per physician, per capita income and
non-physician complementary costs of producing medical care.
The population of the county in which the physician practices
medicine is used as a proxy for the degree of urbanization. Two dummy
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variables are used to test the effect on price. The base for both such
dummy variables is a county population of less than 50,000. The
coefficient of the medium-sizW geographic area (MED) indicates the
price difference between physicians in the base-sized geographic area
and physicians who practice medicine in counties with populations in
the range of 50,000 to 1,000,000. Similarly, the coefficient' of the
large-sized geographic area (LG) indicates the price difference between
physicians in the base-sized geographic area and physicians who prac
tice medicine in counties with populations greater than 1,000,000.
C. Structural Characteristics of the Production Unit
Two variables that together partially describe the structure of the unit
in which the physician produces his services are source of income and type
of practice.
1. Source of professional income
Source of professional income refers to the basis on which a physician
receives his Income. Specifically, it refers to whether he is paid for the
services he performs on a salary basis or on a fee-for-service basis or
some combination of the two.
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Organized medicine has promoted the use of the fee-for-service
principle and has argued that only such an income principle will main
tain a high quality of service. However, the real impetus for prefer
ring fee-for-service over salary arrangements may be to maintain the
high level of prices for physician services. When the fee-for-service
basis is used, the physician's income is more directly related to the
prices charged patients and the physician has a greater personal
incentive to control the use of such pricing policies as price discrim
ination. One can' tentatively hypothesize that the more a physician
gets away from the use of straight fee-for-service, the lower will be
the price charged.
The AMA data set categorizes physicians according to their relative
usage of the fee-for-service principle as the basis for determining
physician.income, Fee-for-service only is the base used for the follow
ing three dummy variables that measure the source of professional
income:
F/S - fee-for-service primarily, but some salary
S/F - salary primarily, but some fee-forrservice
S - salary only
Thus, to lend support to the AMA's traditional argument for usage of the
fee-for-service principle, the empirical results should show that each
of the above three dummy variables has a negative effect on price and that
the absolute value of the coefficient of each successive variable is
larger than the previous one, as compared to the base of fee-for-service only
2. Type of practice
Type of practice refers to which of the following categories of
practice the physician is engaged in: solo practice, partnership,
informal association or group practice.
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The net effect on price of the type of practice the physician is
engaged in cannot be hypothesized a priori because two effects may
theoretically result that influence price in opposing directions. On-
the one hand, the larger the practice a physician is associated with,
the greater are the opportunities for realization of economies of scale
in the production of medical care. Such increased economies of scale
are graphically revealed by downward shifts in the cost and supply
curves thus inducing the potential for a decrease in costs and prices.
On the other hand, larger combinations of physicians may be expected
to allow more specialization by each physician (even within a specialty
field of medicine), thereby raising the quality of each physician's
services and thus inducing an increase in price.
Dummy variables are used to measure the effect of type of practice
on prices. Solo practice was selected as the base. Variable PRT
(partnership) measures the effect on price of a physician practicing
in a partnership with another physician as compared to being engaged in.
.solo practice. Variable GRP (group practice) similarly measures the
effect on price of a physician being a member of a group practice as
compared to being engaged in solo practice.
D. Costs of Producing Medical Care
The cost of producing medical care is hypothesized to have a positive
effect on physician's prices by shifting the physician's cost curves upward.
Unless there is wide variation among physicians in the number of patients
seen annually, different total expenses imply different average costs per
patient. The hypothesized positive relationship between costs and physician
fees is expected to hold for each of the components of the cost of providing
medical services as well as for its aggregate.
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To test the significance of costs, a measure of total yearly expenses
(EXP) is employed which includes those expenses (measured in units of $1000)
that are allowable business deductions for federal income tax purposes. In
addition, tests of the hypothesized positive relationship between prices and
costs are conducted for a variety of the components of total expenses. These
cost components (measured in dollars) are as follows:
W 6c S - employees' wages and salaries
RNT - rent
UTL - utilities
MAL - malpractice insurance
INS - other insurance (related to medical practice)
CAR - professional car
EQP - purchase, rental or lease of equipment
SER - non-medical professional services (legal, accounting, etc.)
SUP - drugs and medical supplies
III RESULTS
The process of selecting variables for inclusion in each price equation
began by including in the initial equations for each procedure as many of the
variables expected to influence price as was possible. No tested equation
included all the independent variables discussed above for the following two
reasons. First, the amended data set included two or more alternative
variables measuring several factors expected to affect price; for example,
variables YRS^, YRS2 and YRS^ are all measures of the degree of experience of
the physician. Because of the expected high correlation between such variables,
inclusion of only one of the three at a time was appropriate to avoid multi-
collinearity. The second limitation is likely to be more serious. Many
of the physicians in the data set failed to provide information on all the
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variables included in this analysis. In an attempt to'employ large numbers of
observations on all the variables tested, each regression equation includes^
only those physicians who provided data on all the variables to be included
in the particular regression; excluded from each price equation were those
observations for which data was missing for any variable or variables included
in that equation. It is possible that this selection method biased the
results obtained; however, the same variables that were significant in one
sample of physicians for a given procedure were generally of the same sign
and degree of significance in equations employing somewhat different samples
of physicians. Thus, the results do not appear sensitive to the different
subsamples of physicians.
After reviewing the results of the initial regressions, the empirical
investigation proceeded by including in subsequent price equations those
variables that were statistically significant or approached such significance
in the initial regressions. Thus, the regression equations in Table 3 include
only those variables that were statistically significant price determinants
for at least one of the two procedures tested. Tables 1 and 2 respectively
present the means and standard deviations and the correlation matrices for
these variables.
[INSERT TABLES 1 AND 2 HERE]
The statistically significant determinants of physicians' fees for the
two procedures are especially easy to compare since the means of the prices
of the two procedures are very close; the mean fee for the appendectomy
procedure is $198.04, while the mean for the obstetrical care procedure is
$199.50.
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
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nic equations explain between 28 and 30 percent of the variance in fees
for the appendectonty procedure and between 54 and 57 percent of the variance
-2for the obstetrical care procedure. These R s are reasonable high, given that
the data is cross-sectional. In general, the results indicate that the explan
atory variable categories of physician characteristics, demographic character
istics and costs of producing medical care are more significant determinants
of physician fees than are the structural characteristics of the physician's
practice.
A. Physician Characteristics
1. Degree of specialization
Variables PSP and OSP are the two dummy variables that measure the
physician's degree of specialization. For the obstetrical care procedure,
the coefficients of PSP (primary specialty) indicate that a physician who
specializes in Obstetrics and Gynecology receives approximately $63 more
than does a general practitioner. Similarly, a physician specializing
in Surgery receives approximately $18 more for performing an appendectomy
than does a general practitioner. For both procedures the physicians
primary specialty (PSP) was always positive as hypothesized and statis
tically significant at the 99% level. However, primary specialty has a
more substantial effect on price (more than three times the dollar amount)
for the obstetrical care procedure than for the appendecton^ procedure.
This may be due to the nature of the.procedures themselves. Surely
patients requiring the obstetrical care procedure have a good indication
of the cause of their medical problem (namely, pregnancy) at the time
they select a physician; it should be obvious to the patient which type
of specialist performs the warranted medical services. However, this is
not likely to be the common situation with respect to the appendectomy
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procedure, in. which case the early sjmiptoms do not provide the patient
a clear indication of what specialty of physician is most appropriate.
As a result, obstetricians and gynecologists may have a larger degree
of monopoly power with respect to the obstetrical care procedure than
do surgeons with respect to the appendectomy procedure.
The empirical results for OSP (other specialty) are somewhat mixed.
As hypothesized, the sign of OSP was always positive and the magnitude
of the coefficient of OSP was less than that of PSP; however, while OSP was
typically statistically significant at "the 95% level in the obstetrical
care equations, it was not a significant determinant of the appendectomy
fee.
2. Years of experience
As discussed earlier, the three highly correlated measures of the
physician's length of experience were tested separately. ' The three
measures were YRS^ (years since graduation from medical school), YRS^
(years in specialty), and YRS^ (years in specialty, excluding residency).
In the price equations for both procedures tested, none of the three
measures of experience was ever statistically significant, not even at
the 90% level, and the signs of the coefficients varied in no systematic
pattern. Such non-significant results are not surprising since, as
discussed previously, the amount of experience possessed by a physician
may lead to several effects that influence price in opposing directions.
The Steinwald and Sloan study (using similar AMA data for 1970-71)
included three dummy variables measuring the age and/or experience of
the physician and also found the signs of the coefficients to vary and
to seldom attain statistical significance [14, 506-507].
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3. Physician sex'
The hypothesized existence of sex descrimination on the part of
patients in selecting physicians and the resulting negative effect on
fee received by female physicians is supported by the statistical
results obtained in the regression equations for both procedures tested.
Ceteris paribus, being a woman physician reduces the fee received for
an appendectoihy by more than $53. For the appendectomy procedure, the
sex variable has the largest coefficient of any of the independent
variables and is statistically significant at the 99% level. Being a
woman physician also reduces the price charged for the obstetrical
care procedure; however, the size of the sex coefficient is substantially
smaller (approximately $15) than it is in the appendectony regression
equation and is statistically significant at only the 90% level.
B. Demographic Characteristics
1. Per capita income
For both procedures tested the coefficient of INC (which measures
the per capita income of the state in which the physician practices)
was always positive as hypothesized and statistically significant at
the 99% level. While the values of the coefficients of INC are small
(.02 for obstetrical care and .03 for appendectomy), the statistical
results provide empirical support for the hypothesis that there exists
geographic price discrimination in the sense that physicians charge
higher prices in those geographic areas that are characterized' by higher
levels of income.
2. Population per physician
Before considering the results obtained for this variable, the
reader should be reminded that population per physician was measured
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quite imprecisely. Variable P/P is the average population per physician
of all counties having the same county size group code classification as
the county in which the physician practices. Using such a rough measure
of population per physician may be at least partially responsible for
the results obtained.
In all regression equations that included P/P, the coefficient was
always negative and statistically significant at the 99% level. As
discussed earlier, theory predicts that, in the absence of excess demand,
the sign will be positive; however, if excess demand prevails, population
per physician is not expected to have a significant effect on price. The
only theory consistent with the negative and significant coefficients
obtained is that physicians price in order to achieve a target income.
Because P/P is based on county size group codes, the negative corre-
✓
lation coefficients between P/P and LG are relatively high (see Table 2),
due to this, the regression equations presented in Table 3 include
equations where P/P and the two variables measuring the degree of urban
ization (MED and LG) were used separately as well as together. While
the coefficients of P/P varied somewhat, the direction and degree of
statistical significance of P/P remained the same.
One might be tempted to discount the results obtained for the
population per physician variable due to the poor measure used. However,
it should be noted that Newhouse found the same unexpected sign; a
partial correlation coefficient of +.55 was found between the number of
physicians per person and price charged for office visits by general
12practitioners [13, 178], In their study of the determinants of
physicians' fees, Steinwald and Sloan claimed that "the use of gross
measures of physician supply does not permit distinguishing among
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varying degrees of substitutability of services of physicians in different
specialties" [14, 501], As a result, they tested the influence on physician
fees of two measures of relative physician supply in the physician's
geographic area: MDPOPl is the number of physicians in the physician's
field per 1000 population; MDP0P2 is the number of physicians in other
fields per 1000 population. A priori, they hypothesized that the with-in
field cross-elasticity of demand (MDPOPl) would be higher than the between-
field cross-elasticity (MDP0P2). However, the results were inconclusive '
with the signs and degree of statistical significance varying greatly for
both measures of relative physician supply [14, 506-507].
3. Degree of urbanization
Because the same nine county size group code variables were used to
construct both the two dummy variables measuring the degree of urbanization
and the population per physician variable, the regression results presented
in Table 3 include equations containing both these constructed variables
(equations 3), as well as equations containing only one of these constructed
variables (equations 1 and 2), Where MED and LG are included and P/P is
excluded, both procedures reveal the degree of urbanization to have a
significant and substantial positive effect on physician price. Also, as
hypothesized, the magnitude of the coefficient of LG was larger than that
of MED for both procedures. However, when the regression equations
include MED, LG, and P/P (equations 3), the statistical significance and
%
the coefficients of MED and LG are substantially reduced; while LG remains
positive, it is significant only at the 95% level for the obstetrical care
procedure and is not significant for the appendecton^ procedure. For
both procedures, the coefficient of MED becomes negative. Thus, as
hypothesized, MED and LG appear to be largely reflective of at least
19
some of the same factors revealed in the population per physician
variable.
C. Structural Characteristics of the Production Unit
1. Source of income
The coefficients for the three variables indicating source of pro
fessional income (F/S, S/F, and S) varied in sign and magnitude and were
almost always not statistically significant. To the extent that price and
quality of medical care are positively related, these results do not
support those who argue that continuation of the fee-for-service
principle is necessary to maintain high quality of medical service.
2. Type of practice
The results indicate that the type of practice a physician is engaged
in (solo, partnership or group) does not affect prices charged. For both
procedures, the coefficients of PRT and GRP varied in sign and were never
statistically significant price determinants. These results are similar
to those found in the Steinwald and Sloan study which also used dummy
variables to represent different practice sizes (solo, 2-5 MD's and more
than 5 MD's) [14, 505].
D. Costs of Producing Medical Care
As hypothesized, the effect of total expenses (EXP) was always positive
and statistically significant at the 99% level.
When the components of total expenses were tested, the following
patterns emerged. For both procedures, malpractice insurance was consistently
positive as hypothesized and significant at the 99% level. The coefficient of
malpractice insurance ranged from .003 to .011 for the appendecton^ procedure
and from .015 to .016 for the obstetrical care procedure. The positive effect
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of malpractice insurance on physician price is especially noteworthy in view
of the recent steep increases in malpractice insurance rates.
For the appendectomy procedure, rent and non-medical professional
expenses (legal, accounting, etc.) were also positive and typically signifi
cant at the 997o level; for the obstetrical care procedure these two cost
components had positive signs.but were only significant at the 90% level. All
other expense components were not statistically significant for both procedures
and carried signs that varied in no systematic pattern, with the exceptions
that employees' wages and salaries, professional car, and drugs and medical
supplies were consistently negative.
IV SUMMARY
This study has sought to identify and statistically test some of the
determinants of physician pricing; these potential determinants were grouped
into four categories: physician characteristics, demographic characteristics,
structural characteristics of the production unit, and costs of producing
medical care. The effects of these variables were tested via multiple linear
regression analysis using individual physician data for two medical procedures,
appendectomy and obstetrical care.
The empirical results indicate that both supply and demand variables
have substantial impacts on physician fees. Among the physician character
istics, the degree of specialization and the sex of the physician were found
to be inq^ortant price determinants; however, the number of years of experience
of the physician does not appear to influence price. All the variables tested
that describe the area in which the physician practices were found to affect
the fee charged. As expected, both the per capita income and the degree of
urbanization generally had positive effects on price. However, population
per physician was found to have a significant negative effect on price; this
21
result has been* reported in another study and provides some additional
support for the target income theory of physician pricing.
Neither of the sets of variables describing the structure of the
physician's practice (source of professional income and type of practice)
"was found to significantly or consistently influence price.
Finally, the analysis indicates that the level of total expenses incurred
in providing medical care has a positive and significant effect on fee, as does
the malpractice insurance cost component.
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Table 1
Variable Means and Standard Deviations
Procedure: Obstetrical Care Appendectomy
Variables
FEE 199.50 198.04
(61.40) (53.79)
INC 2883.97 ' 2915.06
(431.49) (421.66)
P/P 956.46 917,91
(495.00) (464.59)
EXP 24.91 24.10
(18.88) (19.82)
PSP 0.31 0.45
(0.46) (0.50)
OSP 0.06 0.10
(0.23) (0.30)
SX 0.02 0.01
(0.13) (0.08)
MED 0.28 0.28
(0.45) (0.45)
LG 0.43 0.46
(0.50) (0.50)
Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
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FOOTNOTES
1. Some returned questionnaires were eliminated from consideration because
they either lacked complete or consistent answers or were returned by
physicians who were retired or engaged in federal service.
2. The obstetrical care procedure includes antepartum care, obstetrical
delivery and postpartum care (with or without low forcepts, and for
episiotomy).
3. The obstetrical care and appendectomy procedures were selected primarily
for their uniformity; other possible procedures (such as initial office
visit or follow-up hospital visit) were not selected because it was
assumed that the fees for these would vary greatly among patients with.
different "special circumstances", and therefore only a small part of
their total price variation could be explained by the variables for which
data was available.
4. Measuring the dependent variable by the average price a physician charges
a patient of middle income may introduce a bias since physicians' ideas
of what constitutes middle income may vary among physicians. Measuring
price in this manner was presumably undertaken in an attempt to arrive
at a single price for every procedure each physician performs. However,
it is often assumed that at least some physicians engage in price dis
crimination according to the patient's ability-to-pay.
5. Although it would have been desirable to include specialty board
certification as a measure of the quality of the physician's degree of
specialization, the data set did not allow this. However, since most
patients are probably more likely to be aware of a physician's specialty
than his certification status in the specialty, lack of board certification
data may not be important. But for those procedures (such as surgical ones)
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where the choice of the physician to perform the procedure is likely to
be based to some degree on another physician's referral, the certification
status of the physician may be expected to a more important determinant of
the demand for a physician and consequently the price of his services;
this, of course, is the case only if physicians do consider specialty
board certification in making referral recommendations.
6. No data was available to measure the extent to which experienced physicians
keep informed of new medical knowledge by attending professional meetings,
reading medical journals, and so forth. Similarly, no data was available
to measure the quality of the physician's services by the medical school
attended or by the physician's class ranking while attending medical
school or during the internship or residency programs.
7. For three recent surveys indicating that patients, as a whole, prefer
male to female physicians, see references 4, 10 and 16.
8. However, while income is often an appropriate measure-of a person's
^^ility-to-pay, the extent of an individual's medical insurance coverage
is often a better measure, especially for those procedures typically
covered by major medical insurance. Nevertheless, measuring ability-to-
pay by income may still be appropriate if an individual's medical insurance
coverage is positively related to his income level.
9. The nine categories of county population are as follows. Non-metropolitan:
less than 10,000; 10,000-24,999; 25,000-49,999; and 50,000 or more. Metro
politan: potential metropolitan; 50,000-499,999; 500,000-999,999;
1,000,000-4,999,999; and 5,000,000 or more.
10. The same holds for total expenses and its components, and, to a lesser
degree for population per physician and degree of urbanization.
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11. For further discussion of those results, see reference 1.
12. Newhouse also found a partial correlation coefficient of +.13 between
dental prices and the number of dentists per person [13, 178],
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